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Abstract
The secure and robust functioning of a network relies on
the defect-free implementation of network applications. As
network protocols have become increasingly complex, how-
ever, hand-writing network message processing code has be-
come increasingly error-prone.
In this paper, we present a domain-specific language,
Zebu, for generating robust and efficient message processing
layers. A Zebu specification, based on the notation used in
RFCs, describes protocol message formats and related pro-
cessing constraints. Zebu-based applications are efficient,
since message fragments can be specified to be processed
on demand. Zebu-based applications are also robust, as
the Zebu compiler automatically checks specification con-
sistency and generates parsing stubs that include validation
of the message structure. Using a message torture suite in
the context of SIP and RTSP, we show that Zebu-generated
code is both complete and defect-free.
Keywords: Domain-specific Languages, Message process-
ing, Network protocols.
1. Introduction
In the Internet era, many applications, ranging from in-
stant messaging clients and multimedia players to HTTP
servers and proxies, involve processing network protocol
messages. A key part of this processing is to parse messages
as they are received from the network. As message parsing
represents the front line of interaction between the appli-
cation and the outside world, the correctness of the parser
is critical; any bugs can leave the application open to at-
tack [16]. In the context of in-network application such as
proxies, where achieving high throughput is essential, pars-
ing must also be efficient.
Implementing a correct and efficient network protocol
message parser, however, is a difficult task. One issue is
that the Requests for Comments (RFCs) that define these
protocols typically specify the message syntax using a vari-
ant of BNF. Such a specification amounts to a state machine,
which for efficiency is often implemented in an unstructured
way using gotos. The resulting code is thus error-prone and
difficult to maintain. Another issue is that some kinds of
message processing may only use part of the message. For
example, a router normally only uses the header fields that
describe the message destination, and ignores the header
fields that describe properties of the message body [15]. It is
thus desirable, for efficiency, to defer the parsing of certain
message fragments to when their values are actually used.
In this case, complex parsing code may end up scattered
throughout the application.
In the programming languages community, parsers have
long been constructed using automated parser generators
such as yacc [9]. Nevertheless, such tools are not suitable
for generating parsers for network protocol messages, as the
grammars provided in RFCs are often not context free, and
such tools provide no support for deferring the parsing of
some message fragments. Thus, parsers for network proto-
col messages have traditionally been implemented by hand.
This situation, however, is becoming increasingly impracti-
cal, given the variety and complexity of protocols that are
continually being developed. For example, the Gaim instant
messaging client parses more than 10 different instant mes-
saging protocols.1 SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [18],
which is mainly used in telephony over IP, has a multitude
of variants and extensions, implying that SIP parsers must
be tolerant of minor variations in the message structure and
be extensible. Incorrect or inefficient parsing makes the ap-
plication vulnerable to denial of service attacks, as illus-
trated by the “leading slash” vulnerability found in the Flash
HTTP Web server [16]. In our experiments (Section 4), we
have crashed the widely used SER router [15] for SIP via a
stream of 2416 incorrect messages, sent within 17 seconds.
To address the growing complexity of network protocol
messages and the inadequacy of standard tools, some parser
generators have recently been developed that specifically
1GAIM. http://gaim.sourceforge.net
target the kinds of complex data layouts found in network
protocol messages. These tools include DATASCRIPT [1]
and PacketTypes [11] for binary protocols, and PADS [5],
GAPA [3] and binpac [14] for both binary and text-based
protocols. However, except GAPA, none of these tools ac-
cepts BNF as the input language, and thus, the RFC spec-
ification must be translated to another formalism, which
is tedious and error prone. Furthermore, such approaches
have mainly targeted fixed applications, which do not re-
quire fine-grained control over when parsing occurs. While
these approaches relieve some of the burden of implement-
ing a network protocol message parser, there still remains a
gap between these tools and the needs of applications.
We propose to directly address the issues of correctness
and efficiency at the parser generator level. For this, we
present a domain-specific language, Zebu, for describing
HTTP-like text-based protocol message formats and related
processing constraints. Zebu is an extension of ABNF (Aug-
mented BNF [4]), the variant of BNF used in RFCs and thus
the programmer can simply copy a network protocol mes-
sage grammar from an RFC to begin developing a parser.
Zebu extends ABNFwith annotations indicating which mes-
sage fields should be stored in data structures, and other se-
mantic information. Fields can be declared as lazy, which
gives control over the time when the parsing of a field oc-
curs. A Zebu specification is processed by a compiler that
generates stubs to be used by an application to process net-
work messages. Based on the annotations, the Zebu com-
piler implements domain-specific optimizations to reduce
the memory usage of a Zebu-based application. Besides effi-
ciency, Zebu also addresses robustness, as the compiler per-
forms many consistency checks, and can generate parsing
stubs that validate the message structure.
This paper In this paper, we introduce the Zebu language
for describing protocol message formats and related pro-
cessing constraints. Zebu builds on the ABNF notation typ-
ically used to describe protocol grammars. We present an
assessment of its performance and robustness in the context
of SIP, HTTP, and RTSP (Real Time Streaming Protocol 2).
Our contributions are as follows:
• We present the motivations for Zebu and the principal
decisions that we have taken for its design.
• We have used Zebu to implement parsers for SIP,
HTTP, and RTSP. Each parser required less than half
a day of development time.
• We have tested Zebu-based SIP and RTSP parsers and
standard existing SIP and RTSP parsers on streams of
valid and invalid messages based on a message torture
suite. While the Zebu-based parsers accept all of the
valid messages and reject all of the invalid messages,
2http://www.rtsp.org
the existing SIP and RTSP parsers we have tested reject
up to about 4% of the valid messages and reject only at
most 25% of the invalid ones.
• Finally, we show that the added safety and robustness
provided by Zebu does not significantly impact perfor-
mance. Indeed, our performance evaluation for SIP
shows that a Zebu-based parser can be as efficient on
average as a hand-crafted one.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses specific characteristics of network protocol mes-
sage parsing code, illustrating its inherent complexity. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the Zebu language, and describes the veri-
fication of specifications and the generation of parsing stub
functions. Section 4 assesses the robustness and perfor-
mance of Zebu-based parsers. Section 5 described related
work and Section 6 concludes.
2. Issues in Developing Network Protocol
Parsers
To illustrate the growing complexity of network proto-
col messages and the inadequacy of existing approaches for
creating the associated parsers, we consider the SIP proto-
col [18]. The SIP message syntax is similar to that of other
recent text-based protocols such as HTTP and RTSP. A SIP
message begins with a line indicating whether the message
is a request (including a protocol method name) or a re-
sponse (including a return code). A sequence of required
and optional headers then follows. Finally, a SIP message
can include a body containing the payload. Widely used SIP
parsers include that of the SIP Express Router (SER) [15]
and the oSIP library3 used in, e.g., the open PBX Asterisk.4
Both parsers are hand-written.
We first present an extract of the ABNF specification of
the SIP message grammar, and then describe the difficulties
in hand-writing the corresponding parser. We next consider
to what extent these difficulties are addressed by existing
parser generation tools, and describe the issues involved in
integrating a parser with a network application.
2.1. ABNF formalism
The ABNF formalism is a modified version of the well
known Backus-Naur Form (BNF), and is mainly used for
Internet technical specifications. The differences between
standard BNF and ABNF involve rule names, repetition, al-
ternatives, order independence, and value ranges. An extract
of the ABNF specification of the SIP message grammar is
shown in Figure 1. Lines 1 to 6 define the structure of a
request line, which appears at the beginning of a message,
3The GNU oSIP library. http://www.gnu.org/software/osip
4Asterisk: The open source PBX. http://www.asterisk.org
and lines 7 to 10 define the structure of the CSeq header
field, which is used to identify the collection of messages
making up a single transaction.
1 Request-Line = Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF
2 Method = INVITEm / ACKm / OPTIONSm / BYEm
/ CANCELm / REGISTERm / extension-method
3 INVITEm = %x49.4E.56.49.54.45 ; INVITE in caps
4 Request-URI = SIP-URI / SIPS-URI / absoluteURI
5 SIP-Version = "SIP" "/" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT
6 extension-method = token
7 CSeq = "CSeq" HCOLON 1*DIGIT LWS Method
8 LWS = [*WSP CRLF] 1*WSP ; linear whitespace
9 SWS = [LWS] ; sep whitespace
10 HCOLON = *( SP / HTAB ) ":" SWS
Figure 1. Extract of the ABNF of the message
syntax from the SIP RFC 3261
An ABNF specification consists of a set of derivation
rules, each defining a set of alternatives, separated by /.
An alternative is a sequence of terminals and nonterminals.
Among the terminals, a quoted string is case insensitive.
Case sensitive strings must be specified as an explicit se-
quence of character codes, as in the INVITEm rule (line 3).
ABNF includes a general form of repetition, n*m X, that
indicates that at least n and at most m occurrences of the
terminal or nonterminal X must be present. ABNF also de-
fines shorthands such as n* for n*∞, *n for 0*n, * for
0*∞ and n for n*n. Therefore, 1*DIGIT in the CSeq rule
(line 7) represents a sequence of digits of length at least 1.
Brackets are used as a shorthand for 0*1.
2.2. Hand-writing parsers
The specification of the CSeq header in Figure 1 amounts
to only four lines of ABNF (lines 7 to 10). However, imple-
menting parsing based on such an ABNF specification effi-
ciently in a general-purpose language often requires many
lines of code. For example, SER and oSIP contain about
200 and 340 lines of C and C++ code, respectively, specifi-
cally for parsing the CSeq header. This CSeq-specific code
includes operations for reading individual characters from
the message, operations for transitioning in a state machine
according to the characters that are read, calls to various
generic header parsing operations, and error checking code.
Among the complexities encountered is the fact that, as
shown in Figure 1, a CSeq header value can stretch over
multiple lines if the continuation line begins with a space or
horizontal tab (WSP).
In addition to the constraints described by the ABNF
specification, the parser developer has to take into account
constraints on the message structure that are informally
specified in the RFC text. For example, the CSeq header
includes a CSeq number, expressed as any sequence of at
least one digit (1*DIGIT), and a CSeq method (Method).
The SIP RFC states that the CSeq number must be an un-
signed integer that is less than 231 and that the CSeq method
must be the same as the method specified in the request line.
However, existing hand-written implementations do not al-
ways check all these properties. For example, oSIP con-
verts the CSeq number to an integer without performing any
verification. If the CSeq number contains any non-numeric
characters, the result is meaningless.
2.3. Using parser generators
Existing parser generators for text-based protocols in-
clude PADS [5], binpac [14], and the parser generator of
the GAPA platform [3]. PADS and binpac use a type-
declaration like format for specifying message grammars,
while GAPA uses a BNF-like format. Both of these formats
require reorganizing the information in the ABNF specifi-
cation. Binpac is targeted towards a Network Intrusion De-
tection System, and thus it does not provide high-level sup-
port for fine-grained parsing. For example, it provides type
abstractions for generic message elements such as digits,
but more complex message element decomposition must be
performed with regular expressions. The GAPA language,
which is not publicly available, is tightly-coupled to a run-
time framework specialized for the creation of network an-
alyzers; it is not clear how it could be used to build other
kinds of applications. Thus, we take PADS as a concrete ex-
ample because, of the three, its goals are the most generic.
Figure 2 shows a PADS specification corresponding to the
four lines of ABNF describing the CSeq header. This spec-
ification is in the spirit of the HTTP specification provided
by the PADS developers [13].
1 bool chkCSeqMethod (request_line_t r, Cseq_t c) {
2 return ( r.method == c.method );
3 }
4 Ptypedef Puint16_FW(:3:) Cseq_number_t :
5 CSeq_t x => { 100 <= x && x < 699 };
6 Pstruct wsp_crlf_t {
7 PString_ME(:"(\\s|\\t)* \\r\\n":) wsp;
8 };
9 POpt wsp_crlf_t o_wsp_crlf_t;
10 Pstruct lws_t {
11 o_wsp_crlf_t wsp_crlf;
12 PString_ME(:"(\\s|\\t)+":) wsp;
13 };
14 POpt lws_t sws_t;
15 Pstruct hcolon_t {
16 PString_ME(:"(\\s|\\t)*":) sp_or_htab;
17 ’:’; sws_t sws;
18 };
19 Pstruct CSeq_t {
20 PString_ME(:"[Cc][Ss][Ee][Qq]":) name;
21 hcolon_t hcolon; CSeq_number_t number;
22 lws_t lws; method_t method;
23 };
24 Precord Pstruct SIP_msg {
25 request_line_t request_line;
26 CSeq_t cseq: chkCSeqMethod(request_line,cseq);
27 };
[...]
Figure 2. PADS SIP RFC 3261 specification
A PADS specification describes both the grammar and
the data structures that will contain the result of parsing the
message. Thus, the rules of the ABNF specification need to
be translated manually into what amount to structure dec-
larations in PADS. As a PADS structure must be declared
before it is used, the rule ordering is often forced to be dif-
ferent than that of the ABNF specification. For example,
in the ABNF specification, the CSeq nonterminal is defined
before the LWS, SWS, and HCOLON nonterminals, while in the
PADS specification, the structure corresponding to the CSeq
nonterminal is defined afterwards (line 19). PADS also
does not implement the same default parsing strategies as
ABNF, and thus e.g., case insensitive strings must be speci-
fied explicitly using regular expressions (line 20). Similarly,
translating SIP whitespace into PADS requires writing many
lines of specifications (lines 6-15), including regular expres-
sions which are known to be time-consuming and difficult to
write and error-prone. Finally, the PADS specification must
express the various constraints contained in the RFC text.
Although PADS allows the developer to define constrained
types (lines 5-6), which are used here in the case of the CSeq
number (line 21), non-type constraints such as the relation-
ship between the method mentioned in the request line and
the method mentioned in the CSeq header must be imple-
mented by arbitrary C code (lines 1-3 and line 26).
Of these issues, probably the most difficult for the pro-
grammer is to convert ABNF specifications to regular ex-
pressions. Regular expressions for even simple ABNF spec-
ifications are often complex and voluminous. For example,
a regular expression for a URI has been published that is 45
lines of code.5 Although a tool has been developed to con-
vert an ABNF specification to a regular expression,5 in the
PADS, GAPA, and binpac specifications that we have seen,
the regular expressions appear to have been written by hand,
and sometimes do not capture all of the RFC constraints.
2.4. Integrating a parser with an application
The ease of integrating a parser with an application de-
pends on whether the parser parses the fields needed by the
application, and whether the result of this parsing is stored
in appropriate data structures. We consider the issues that
arise when using the handwritten oSIP and SER parsers, and
when using a parser generated by a tool such as PADS.
oSIP parses the fixed set of required SIP header fields,
and separates the rest of the message into pairs of a header
field name and the corresponding raw unparsed data. Appli-
cations that do not use all of the required header fields still
incur the time cost of parsing them (see Section 4). Appli-
cations that use the many SIP extensions must parse these
header fields themselves. The former increases the applica-
tion time and space requirements, which can be critical in
the case of in-network applications such as proxies, while
the latter leaves the application developer to develop com-
plex parsing code on his own.
5Abnf2Regex. http://cvs.m17n.org/∼akr/abnf/.
SER provides more fine-grained parsing than oSIP, as it
parses only those header fields that are requested by the ap-
plication. By default, however, SER only gives direct access
to the top-level subfields of a header, such as the complete
URI. To extract, e.g., only the host portion of a URI, the
programmer must intervene. One approach is for an applica-
tion using SER to reparse the subfield, to obtain the desired
information. SER applications are written using a domain-
specific language targeted towards routing, which does not
provide string-matching facilities. Nevertheless, SER pro-
vides an escape from this language, allowing a SER appli-
cation to invoke an arbitrary shell script. A SER application
can thus invoke a script written in a language such as Perl
to extract the desired information. This approach, however,
incurs a high performance penalty for forking a new process
(see Section 4) and compromises the safety benefits of using
the SER language. Another approach is to use the SER ex-
tension framework, which, a` la Apache,6 allows integrating
new modules into the parsing process. Although efficient,
this approach requires the programmer to write low level C
code that conforms to rather contorted requirements. Again,
incorrect behavior inside a module may compromise the ro-
bustness of the whole application.
Finally, parser generators such as PADS allow the devel-
oper to construct the parser such that it parses only as much
of the message as is needed. However, the generated data
structures directly follow the specified parsing rules, imply-
ing that accessing message fields often requires long chains
of structure field references. Furthermore, all of the parsed
data is stored, which increases the memory footprint.
3. Robust Parser Development with Zebu
We now present the Zebu language for describing HTTP-
like text-based protocol message formats and related pro-
cessing constraints. Zebu is based on ABNF, as found
in RFCs, and extends it with annotations indicating which
message fields should be stored in data structures and other
semantic attributes. These annotations express both con-
straints derived from the protocol RFC and constraints that
are specific to the target application. From a Zebu specifica-
tion, a compiler automatically generates stubs to be used by
the application to process network messages.
The features of Zebu are driven by the kinds of infor-
mation that an application may want to extract from a net-
work protocol message. We first consider the features that
are needed to do this processing robustly and efficiently,
and then present the corresponding annotations that the pro-
grammer must add to the ABNF specification so that the
Zebu compiler can generate the appropriate stub functions.
Finally, we describe the Zebu compiler, which performs
both verification and code generation, and the process of
constructing an application with Zebu.
6Apache. HTTP server project. http://www.apache.org.
3.1. Issues
A HTTP-like text-based network message consists of a
command line, a collection of header fields, and a message
body. The command line indicates whether the message is a
request or a response, and identifies basic information such
as the version of the protocol and the method of a request
message. A header field specifies a protocol-specific key
and an associated value, which may be composed of a num-
ber of subfields. Finally, the message body consists of free
text whose structure is typically not specified by the proto-
col. Decomposing it further falls out of the scope of Zebu.
From the contents of a message, an application may need
to determine whether the message is a request or a response,
to detect the presence of a particular header field, or to ex-
tract command-line or header-field subfields. Each of these
operations involves retrieving a command line or header
field, and potentially accessing its contents. In a HTTP-like
text-based protocol, each command line or header field nor-
mally occupies one or more complete lines, where each line
after the first begins with a special continuation character.
Thus, as exemplified by the very efficient SIP parser SER,
a parser can be constructed in two levels: a top-level parser
that simply scans each line of the message until it reaches
the desired command line or header field, and a collection
of dedicated parsers that process each type of command
line or header field. The dedicated parsers must respect
both the ABNF specification and any constraints specified
informally in the RFC. To avoid reparsing already parsed
message elements for each requested parsing operation, the
parser should save all parsed data in data structures for later
use, ideally in the format desired by the application.
This analysis suggests that to enable the Zebu compiler
to generate a useful and efficient parser, the programmer
must annotate the ABNF specification obtained from an
RFC with the following information: (1) An indication of
the nonterminal representing the entry point for parsing each
possible command line and header field. (2) A specification
of any constraints on the message structure that are infor-
mally described by the RFC. (3) An indication of the mes-
sage subfields that will be used by the application. The first
two kinds of annotations are generic to the protocol, and
can thus be reused in generating parsers for multiple appli-
cations. The third kind of annotation is application-specific.
This kind of annotation can be viewed as a simplified form
of the action that can be specified when using yacc and
other similar parser generators, in that it allows the program-
mer to customize the memory layout used by the parser to
the specific needs of the application.
3.2. Annotating an ABNF specification
We present the three kinds of annotations required by
Zebu, using as an example an extract of the Zebu specifi-
1 message sip3261 {
2 request {; Request only
3 requestLine = Method:method SP Request-URI:uri
4 SP SIP-Version
5 header CSeq { CSeq.method == requestLine.method }
6 header Max-Forwards { mandatory }
7 }
8 response {; Response only
9 statusLine = SIP-Version SP Status-Code:code
10 SP Reason-Phrase:rphrase
11 }
12 enum Method = INVITEm / ACKm / OPTIONSm / BYEm
13 / CANCELm / REGISTERm / extension-method
14 extension-method = token
15 INVITEm = %x49.4E.56.49.54.45 ; INVITE in caps
16 struct Request-URI = SIP-URI / SIPS-URI / absoluteURI
17 {lazy}
18 uint16 Status-Code = Informational / Redirection
19 / Success / Client-Error
20 / Server-Error / Global-Failure
21 / extension-code
22 uint16 Global-Failure = "600"/ "603"/ "604"/ "606"
23 uint16 extension-code = 3DIGIT
24 {extension-code>=100 && extension-code<=699}
25 header CSeq = 1*DIGIT:number as uint32 LWS Method:method
26 header Max-Forwards = 1*DIGIT:value as uint32 {mandatory}
27 header To { "to" / "t" } =
28 ( name-addr / addr-spec:uri ) *( SEMI to-param )
29 { mandatory }
30 name-addr = [display-name] LAQUOT addr-spec:uri RAQUOT
31 struct addr-spec = SIP-URI / SIPS-URI / absoluteURI
32 { lazy }
33 [...]
Figure 3. Excerpt of the Zebu specification for
the SIP protocol
cation of a SIP parser, as shown in Figure 3.
Parser entry points The Zebu programmer annotates the
rule for parsing the command line of a request message with
requestLine, the rule for parsing the command line of a
response message with statusLine, and the rules for pars-
ing each kind of header with header. Because a command
line or header field cannot contain another command line or
header field, the nonterminals for these lines are no longer
useful. In the case of a command line, the nonterminal is
simply dropped. Thus, for example, the ABNF rule for
the Request-Line nonterminal (Figure 1, line 1) is trans-
formed into the following Zebu rule (Figure 3, line 3):
requestLine = Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version
In the case of a header field, the description of the key is
moved from the right-hand side of the rule to the left, where
it replaces the nonterminal, resulting in a rule whose struc-
ture is suggestive of a key-value pair. For example, the
ABNF CSeq rule on line 7 of Figure 1 is reorganized into
the following Zebu rule (Figure 3, line 25)
header CSeq = 1*DIGIT LWS Method
(The delimiter HCOLON is also dropped, as it is a constant of
the protocol). Some header fields, such as the SIP To header
field, can be represented by any of a set of keys. In this case,
the header is given a name, which is followed by the ABNF
specification of the possible variants, in braces, as shown in
line 27 of Figure 3. As in ABNF, the matching of the header
key, and any other string specified by a Zebu grammar, is
case insensitive.
RFC constraints The text of the RFC for a protocol typ-
ically indicates how often certain header fields may appear,
whether header fields can be modified, and various con-
straints on the values of the header subfields. The Zebu
programmer must annotate the corresponding ABNF rules
with these constraints. Constraints are specified in braces
at the end of a grammar rule. Possible atomic constraints
are that a header field is mandatory (mandatory) and that
a header field can appear more than once (multiple). For
example, in the SIP specification, the header To is specified
to be mandatory (line 27). More complex constraints can
be expressed using C-like boolean expressions. For exam-
ple, in Section 2.2, we noted that in a request message, the
method mentioned in the command line must be the same as
the method mentioned in the CSeq header. This constraint
is described in line 5.
Some constraints on header fields are specific to either
request or response messages. Accordingly, the Zebu pro-
grammer must group the request line and its associated con-
straints in a request block, and the status line and its asso-
ciated constraints in a response block. In the case of SIP,
the request block (lines 2-7) indicates for example that the
Max-Forwards header is mandatory (line 6). The con-
straints in the response block (lines 9-11) have been elided.
Subfields used by the application The parsing functions
generated by the Zebu compiler create a data structure for
each command line or header field that is parsed. By de-
fault, this data structure contains only the type of the com-
mand line or header field and a pointer to its starting point
in the message text. When the application will use a certain
subfield of the command line or message header, the Zebu
programmer can annotate the nonterminal deriving this sub-
field with an identifier name. This annotation causes the
Zebu compiler to create a corresponding entry in the enclos-
ing command line or header field data structure. For exam-
ple, in line 3, the Zebu programmer has indicated that the
application needs to use the method in the command line,
which is given the name method, and the URI, which is
given the name uri.
By default, a subfield is just represented as a pointer to
the start of its value and its size in the message text. Of-
ten, however, the application will need to use the value in
some other form, such as an integer. The Zebu programmer
can additionally specify a type for a named value, either at
the nonterminal reference or at its definition. For example,
in line 25 the CSeq number is specified as being a uint32.
Nonterminals can also be specified as structures (struct),
unions (union), and enumerations (enum).
An application may use the information in certain sub-
fields only in some exceptional cases. The Zebu annotation
lazy specifies that a specific subfield should not be parsed
until requested by the application. In the SIP specification,
Request-URI has this annotation (line 16).
3.3. The Zebu compiler
The Zebu compiler verifies the consistency of the ABNF
specification and the annotations added by the programmer,
and then generates stub functions allowing an application to
parse the command line and header fields and access infor-
mation about the parsed data. The Zebu compiler is around
3700 lines of OCaml code. A run-time environment defin-
ing various utility functions is also provided, and amounts
to around 700 lines of C code.
Verifications Although RFCs are widely published and
form the de facto standard for many protocols, we have
found some errors in RFC ABNF specifications. These are
simple errors, such as typographical errors, but still they
complicate the process of translating an ABNF specifica-
tion into code . The Zebu compiler checks basic consistency
properties of the ABNF specification: that there is no omis-
sion (i.e., each referenced rule is defined), that there is no
double definition, and that there are no cycles.
Additionally, the annotations provided by the Zebu pro-
grammer must be consistent with the ABNF specifica-
tion. For example, in line 22, the nonterminal Global-
Failure is annotated with uint16. This non-terminal is
specified to be an alternation of strings, and thus the Zebu
compiler checks that each element of this alternation repre-
sents an unsigned integer that is less than 216.
Code generation An application does not use the data
structures declared in a Zebu specification directly, but in-
stead uses stub functions generated by the Zebu compiler.
The Zebu compiler can be configured to create stub func-
tions that perform either full validation or minimal valida-
tion of the message structure. The use of stub functions al-
lows parsing to be carried out lazily, so that only as much
data is parsed as is needed to fulfill the request of a given
stub function call. As illustrated in Figure 4a, stub functions
are generated for determining the type of a message (request
or response), for parsing the command line and the various
headers, for accessing individual header subfields, and for
managing the parsing of subfields designated as lazy.
The parsing functions generated by the Zebu compiler
use the two-level parsing strategy described in Section 3.1.
Header-specific parsers use the PCRE7 library for matching
the regular expression of a header value that has been de-
rived from the ABNF specification. The parsing functions
7PCRE - perl custom regular expressions. http://www.pcre.org/
sip3261 sip3261_init();
void sip3261_parse(sip3261, char *, int);
void sip3261_parse_headers(sip3261, E_Headers);
void sip3261_parse_addr_spec(T_Lazy_addr_spec);
T_bool sip3261_isRequest(sip3261);
T_bool sip3261_isResponse(sip3261);
T_Str sip3261_Option_Str_getVal(T_Option_Str);
T_RequestLine sip3261_get_RequestLine(sip3261);
T_RequestLine sip3261_get_RequestLine(sip3261);
T_header_From sip3261_get_header_From(sip3261);
T_Method sip3261_RequestLine_getMethod(T_RequestLine);
T_MethodEnum sip3261_Method_getType(T_Method);
T_Str sip3261_Method_getValue(T_Method);
T_Lazy_addr_spec sip3261_header_From_getUri(T_header_From);
T_addr_spec sip3261_Lazy_Addr_spec_getParsed(T_Lazy_addr_spec);
T_Option_Str sip3261_Addr_spec_gethost(T_addr_spec);
4a. Generated stubs
1 sip3261 msg = sip3261_init();
2 sip3261 msg = sip3261_parse(msg, buf, len);
3 if (sip3261_isRequest(msg)) { // Process only request messages
4 T_RequestLine requestLine = sip3261_get_RequestLine(msg);
5 if (sip3261_Method_getType(sip3261_RequestLine_getMethod(requestLine)) == E_INVITEm) { // Filter INVITE methods
6 sip3261_parse_headers(msg, E_HEADER_FROM); // We parse only the header From
7 T_Lazy_addr_spec l_addr_spec = sip3261_header_From_getUri(sip3261_get_header_From(msg));
8 sip3261_parse_addr_spec(l_addr_spec);
9 T_Option_Str host = sip3261_Lazy_Addr_spec_getParsed(l_addr_spec);
10 if (sip3261_Option_Str_isDefined(host)) { // host may be undefined in some cases, check it and log its value
11 mylog(sip3261_Option_Str_getVal(host));
12 }}} 4b. Application logic
Figure 4. Fragment of a Zebu-based SIP message statistics reporting application
contain run-time assertions that check the constraints spec-
ified in the RFC. Once a header is parsed and checked, its
named subfields, if any, are converted to the specified types
and stored in the data structure associated with the header.
The values of the named subfields can then be accessed us-
ing the “get” stub functions.
3.4. Developing an application with Zebu
The developer defines the application logic as an ordi-
nary C program, using the stub functions to access infor-
mation about the message content. Figure 4b illustrates the
implementation of an application that extracts the host in-
formation from the URI stored in the From header field of
an INVITE message. This kind of operation is useful in,
e.g., an intrusion detection system, which searches for cer-
tain patterns of information in network messages.
The application uses the stubs generated from the
SIP message grammar specification to access the re-
quired information. The application initially uses the
functions sip3261_Method_getType and sip3261_-
RequestLine_getMethod to determine whether the cur-
rent message is an INVITE request (line 5). If so,
it uses the function sip3261_parse_headers to parse
the From header field (line 6), and then the functions
sip3261_header_From_getUri and sip3261_get_-
header_From to extract the URI (line 7). Line 32 of
the Zebu SIP specification indicates that the parsing of
the URI should be lazy, so the function sip3261_Lazy_-
Addr_spec_getParsed is used to force the parsing of
this subfield (line 9). After a check that the host name is
present (line 10), its value is extracted using the function
sip3261_Option_Str_getVal in line 11.
Overall, due to the annotations in the Zebu specification,
stub functions are available to access exactly the message
fragments needed by the application. Similarly, memory us-
age is limited to the application’s declared needs.
4. Experiments
A robust network application must accept valid mes-
sages, to provide continuous service, and reject invalid mes-
sages, to avoid corrupting its internal state, while being ef-
ficient. As the parser is the front-line in the treatment of
network messages, it plays a key role in providing this ro-
bustness and efficiency. We evaluate robustness by compar-
ing the behavior of a Zebu-based parser and a variety of ex-
isting parsers on valid and invalid SIP and RTSP messages.
We evaluate efficiency by measuring the parsing time of var-
ious SIP parsers when applied to messages extracted from a
real SIP trace. We also measure the parsing time for isolated
HTTP messages.
For SIP, we compare the Zebu-based parsers with the
oSIP and SER parsers described in Section 2. For RTSP,
we compare the Zebu-based parsers with the parser in the
widely used VLC streaming server,8 and the parser provided
by the LiveMedia library.9 Figure 1 shows the sizes of these
existing parsers and of the ABNF and Zebu specifications of
the SIP and RTSP message grammars. The Zebu specifica-
tions are up to 12 times smaller than the other parsers. The
Zebu specifications are, however, about 50% longer than the
corresponding ABNF specifications, because they include
rules that are mentioned only by reference to another RFC
in the ABNF.
4.1. Robustness evaluation
To compare the robustness of Zebu-based SIP and RTSP
applications to applications based on hand-crafted parsers,
8The VideoLan project. http://www.videolan.org
9LiveMedia. http://www.livemediacast.net/about/library.cfm
Protocol ABNF size Zebu spec. size Parser Parser size
SIP ≈ 700 1081
oSIP 11982
SER 13277
RTSP ≈ 200 330
VLC ≈ 1200
LiveMedia ≈ 1000
Table 1. Sizes (LOC) of the SIP and RTSPmes-
sage grammars, and of existing parsers.
we create minimal logging applications that parse the fields
designated as mandatory by the SIP and RTSP proto-
cols. The Zebu-based applications, log-Zebu-SIP and
log-Zebu-RTSP, for SIP and RTSP respectively, consist
of a few lines of C code that use the stubs generated by the
Zebu compiler to access network messages, analogous to the
code in Figure 4b. We configure the Zebu compiler to gen-
erate stub functions performing full validation. The SER
application, log-SER, is written using the SER configura-
tion language to access the information in the various fields.
The other applications, log-oSIP using oSIP, log-VLC
using VLC, and log-LiveMedia using LiveMedia, are
written in C using the appropriate API functions provided
by the given parser.
In our experiments, we test the applications on streams
of valid or invalid messages. For the SIP applications, these
messages are created according to the guidelines provided
by the SIP Torture Test Message RFC [19] and for the RTSP
applications, we create messages in the same spirit. Valid
but potentially problematic messages suggested by the SIP
Torture Test Message RFC are typically those with complex
URIs or with special characters such as a space or semicolon
protected with a backslash. Invalid messages suggested by
the SIP Torture Test Message RFC somehow violate the
structural or value constraints of the grammar. An exam-
ple is a SIP response status code of 2 or 4 digits, whereas a
valid response status code always consists of 3 digits.
Valid messages Figure 2 shows that up to about 4% of
the valid messages that we have constructed based on the
SIP Torture Test Message RFC are rejected by hand-crafted
SIP parsers. We have also observed that oSIP crashes on
some valid INVITE messages. The Zebu-based SIP parser
strictly follows the message grammar.
Valid Rejected % rejected
messages messages messages
log-Zebu-SIP 0 0.0%
SIP log-oSIP 549 21 3.9%
log-SER 2 0.4%
Table 2. Coverage for valid SIP messages
We have made an analogous experiment with the RTSP
applications, but the VLC and LiveMedia parsers are quite
lax in their parsing of the message elements, such as the
URI, that are covered by the SIP Torture Test RFC, and thus
all three applications accept all of the messages.
Invalid messages Figure 3 shows that the Zebu-based ap-
plications detect every invalid message, but none of the
hand-crafted parsers detects more than about 25% of the in-
valid messages. A parser that does not detect invalid mes-
sages may return unexpected data to the application, causing
it to crash or malfunction. For example, in the case of SIP
we have crashed SER via a stream of 2416 incorrect mes-
sages, sent within of 17 seconds. Because SER is widely
used for telephony, which is a critical service, the ability to
crash the server is unacceptable.
Invalid Detected % detected
messages messages messages
log-Zebu-SIP 5976 100.0%
SIP log-oSIP 5976 1020 17.1%
log-SER 1512 25.3%
log-Zebu-RTSP 2730 100.0%
RTSP log-VLC 2730 4 0.1%
log-LiveMedia 748 27.4%
Table 3. Coverage for invalid SIP and RTSP
messages
4.2. Performance Evaluation
We now compare the performance of Zebu-based parsers
to that of hand-crafted ones. We first present micro-
benchmarks that we performed for HTTP, and then present
results for SIP based on real message traces.
Our experiments used a Pentium 4 (2.66GHz) as a server,
and an Athlon Mobile 1.6GHz as a client. The client contin-
uously extracts messages from a trace of generated or real
messages and sends them to the server. As we are only con-
sidering the parsing time, the messages frequency is irrele-
vant.
HTTP micro-benchmarks The PADS distribution in-
cludes a specification of a parser for HTTP/1.1. This spec-
ification consists of a combination of PADS structure type
declarations and regular expressions, and amounts to 2000
lines of PADS code. Because of some constraints in the
PADS language, this specification is significantly different
from the ABNF in the HTTP RFC. The Zebu HTTP specifi-
cation, in contrast is only 500 lines, and is very close to the
ABNF. The PADS compiler generates about 150000 lines
of C code from the PADS HTTP specification, whereas the
Zebu compiler generates only about 2400 from the Zebu
specification.
To measure the HTTP message treatment time with
these Zebu- and PADS-generated parsers and with standard
parsers, we have developed applications that log the domain
name of the HOST header field for use with the Zebu-based
parser, the PADS-based parser, and Apache. The appli-
cations using the Zebu-based parser and the PADS-based
parser use the TCP server provided with SER. The Zebu-
based application is 27 lines of C code, the PADS-based
application is 50 lines of C code, and the Apache-based ap-
plication is 9 lines of Apache configuration language code.
For the Zebu-based application, parsing per message with
full validation requires 170,000 cycles on average. For the
PADS-based application, parsing is 1500 times slower, at
about 260,000,000 cycles per message on average. For
Apache, which has a very highly hand-optimized parser,
parsing requires 24,000 cycles per message on average, rep-
resenting 14% of the time needed by the Zebu-based parser.
SIP To experiment with real SIP traces, we have imple-
mented four versions of the SIP message statistics report-
ing application described in Section 3.4. Each application
records the host information of the URI stored in the From
header field of an INVITEmessage. This message statistics
reporting application illustrates the case where an applica-
tion such as a intrusion detection system needs to access a
fragment of a header subfield.
The first version (SER-module) is implemented as a
dedicated SER module to obtain full access to the internal
data structures of SER. This module amounts to 150 lines
of C code and requires 22 lines to be added in the configu-
ration file of the server. The second version (SER-exec)
is written using the SER configuration language and relies
on the escape mechanism provided by SER to invoke sed
to extract the host information. This version consists of 12
lines of SER configuration language code. The third ver-
sion (oSIP) is implemented on top of the oSIP SIP stack.
It consists of 40 lines of C code that configure the stack and
call the different functions the stack provides. The fourth
version (Zebu-full) is the Zebu-based application shown
in Figure 4b with full validation enabled. The last version
(Zebu-minimal) is similar to the previous one, except
that only fields that are annotated to be used by the appli-
cation are validated. In both cases, 28 lines of C code are
required to call the stubs generated by the Zebu compiler.
To explore the time required for parsing various kinds of
messages, we have collected a real trace of SIP messages at
the University of Bordeaux. This trace represents one day
of IP telephony traffic amounting to around 3000 messages.
Figure 4 compares the parsing time for each of the applica-
tions to that of Zebu-minimal.
SER uses the efficient two-level parsing strategy de-
scribed in Section 3.1, to parse only the header fields
that are relevant to the application. The parsing done by
SER-module is particularly efficient, up to three times
faster than Zebu-minimal in the case of request mes-
sages, as the information required by the application is al-
ready available in the SER internal data structures. How-
ever, it is 50% slower than the parsing done by Zebu in the
case of response messages. SER is directed towards rout-
ing applications, and thus it always parses the Via header,
which is essential in the routing process, although irrelevant
to our application. Thus, Zebu can provide better perfor-
mance by being more closely tailored to the needs of the ap-
plication, and retains safety, which is lost when using SER
modules, as described in Section 2.4.
The parsing done by SER-exec is roughly as efficient
as that done by SER-module for the non-INVITE mes-
sage. The parsing done by SER-exec for the INVITE
messages, on the other hand, is about 217 times slower be-
cause it forks a sed process. Despite the bad performance
in this case, the use of the configuration language of SER
remains a valid approach, because it provides ease of pro-
gramming and safety.
The parsing done by oSIP is between 5 and 10 times
slower than the parsing done by Zebu-minimal for re-
quest messages and over 21 times slower for response mes-
sage. In both cases, oSIP parses the six required SIP headers
(plus two more required headers in the case of a REGISTER
message) and stores pointers to the starting point of each
sub-field. As the application requests information about
the INVITE header field, oSIP additionally copies its sub-
fields into a data structure that is provided to the application,
roughly doubling the execution time.
5. Related Work
Parser generators such as DATASCRIPT [1], Packet-
Types [11], PADS [5], GAPA [3] and binpac [14] have
been developed to address the growing complexity of net-
work protocol messages. However, as described in Sec-
tion 2, these tools do not meet all the requirements of net-
work application developers. APG10 is a parser generator
that accepts ABNF directly. Semantic actions are specified
via callback functions rather than annotations on the gram-
mar. We have found such callback functions to be some-
what heavyweight, in our experience with APG. Further-
more, APG is not specific to HTTP-like text-based proto-
cols, and thus cannot implement the two-level parsing strat-
egy outlined in Section 3.1. We have found this strategy
essential to obtaining good performance.
Domain-specific languages have been used successfully
in various application domains including operating sys-
tems [10, 12] and networks [6, 7]. Several of these lan-
guages have explicitly targeted improving system robust-
ness. Devil, in the domain of device-driver development,
provides high-level abstractions for specifying the code
for interacting with the device, and performs a number of
compile-time and (optional) run-time verifications to check
that the specifications are consistent [17]. Promela++ [2]
for specifying network protocols, can be translated automat-
ically both into the model checking language Promela [8]
and into efficient C code, thus easing the development of a
protocol implementation that is both verified and efficient.
10APG. http://www.coastocoastresearch.com/
SER-module SER-exec oSIP Zebu-full Zebu-minimal
Cycles Ratio Cycles Ratio Cycles Ratio Cycles Ratio Cycles Ratio
Request
ACK 25 460 32% 22 690 29% 377 298 481% 81 796 104% 78 406 100%
BYE 22 540 42% 36 608 69% 522 156 984% 77 468 146% 53 060 100%
CANCEL 22 732 46% 52 996 107% 336 036 676% 84 512 170% 49 680 100%
INVITE 34 868 43% 7 593 550 9 438% 525 654 653% 81 670 102% 80 456 100%
OPTIONS 25 872 36% 24 176 34% 339 016 478% 76 144 107% 70 908 100%
REGISTER 31 016 50% 31 096 50% 465 978 751% 65 672 106% 62 028 100%
Response 35 608 151% 35 716 152% 505 312 2 150% 31 806 135% 23 508 100%
Table 4. Performance of the SIP message statistics reporting applications (time in cycles, ratio as
compared to Zebu-minimal)
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the Zebu declarative lan-
guage for describing protocol message formats and related
processing constraints. Zebu builds on the ABNF notations
typically used in RFCs to describe protocol grammars. In
evaluating Zebu, we have focused on analyzing the improve-
ment in robustness that it provides. For this, we have defined
a set of rules based on a message torture suite to generate
valid and invalid SIP and RTSP messages and applied exist-
ing parsers and Zebu-generated parsers to them.
Our experiments show that nearly 4 times more erro-
neous messages are detected by the Zebu-based parser than
by widely-used hand-written parsers. In the case of SIP, we
were able to crash the widely used SER parser [15] via a
stream of 2416 incorrect messages, sent within a space of
17 seconds. Because SER is used for telephony the ability
to crash the server is unacceptable. We have also found valid
messages that are not accepted by the SER and oSIP parsers,
which can similarly have a critical impact. Finally, we have
shown that among the approaches providing safety and ro-
bustness guarantees, Zebu provides good performance.
Availability: The Zebu compiler and experiments men-
tioned in the paper are available at the following web page:
http://phoenix.labri.fr/software/zebu
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